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High speed Internet access is becoming increasingly important to people’s daily lives and futures 
(US FCC, 2010). In an effort to provide broadband services, cities have been investing in fiber 
optic infrastructure which can achieve transmittal speeds at almost 100 times faster than 
traditional Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) Internet (Crawford, 2009). This thesis assesses three 
cities that have attained fiber Internet infrastructure and operations in three radically different 
ways and will identify relevant themes when planning for fiber. Chattanooga, TN, Kansas City, 
MO and Provo, UT are cities that have expressed their understanding of the implications of high-
speed Internet for their communities. Uncovering the planning processes that led to these 
infrastructures as well as assessing the outcomes of them are vital to the pursuit of fiber in other 
localities. Through an evaluation consisting of comprehensive document review, city contracts, 
as well as interviews with related city officials, this study found that infrastructure planning 
processes for fiber-optic Internet vary based on level of state regulation, degree of private sector 
involvement, and perceived notions of economic development. The study also found that intra-
city technological upgrades may have been the initial reasoning for public fiber infrastructure 
ventures; however, when deciding whether to connect fiber Internet to homes, economic 
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Chapter 1: Understanding Fiber 
Introduction 
	  
Since the 1990s, there has been major investment in the construction and deployment of fiber 
optic networks in cities across the United States (Kolko, 2010). Fiber optic cables, which are 
incredibly thin bundles of fiberglass can transmit data at speeds almost 100 times faster than 
traditional Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) connections (Crawford, 2009). With increased 
capacity, the possibilities of this technology may have implications on processes and 
relationships within the city. For instance, the introduction of fiber into the traditional Internet 
service provider (ISP) marketplace has been a game changer, forcing traditional ISPs to offer 
better services at lower prices (Crawford, 2009). This new competition, in a field dominated by 
natural monopolies, manifests as an advantage for the consumer, now paying less for faster 
Internet. Instances like this exemplify the implications of fiber, and many cities have vied for 
innovative ways to supply residents with the high-speed Internet infrastructure.  
Research Question  
	  
By examining city planning processes for fiber and the interactions among providers, the local 
government, and its constituents, this thesis hopes to highlight that planning for improvements in 
Internet technologies can become standard planning practice. Discovering how much cities give 
up in terms of regulation relative to how much benefit they may derive from high-speed Internet 
service needs to be critically assessed. This thesis will utilize three case studies, Chattanooga, 
TN, Provo, UT and Kansas City, MO, to answer the following research question: What are the 





Currently, local city governments tend to yield to private operator demands, a topic that will be 
further discussed in the case studies section of this thesis, yet it is unknown what these 
concessions may realistically cost each city. This thesis works to explore the compromise 
between the provider and the city, a relationship that varies across different geographies and 
contexts.  
Background 
The Internet has become increasingly vital to the productivity and progress of people’s daily 
lives, yet over 100 million Americans are left without a broadband connection at home (US FCC, 
2010). Broadband, according to the FCC is “access to internet at significantly higher speeds than 
those available through ‘dial up’ services” and include DSL, cable modem, wireless, satellite, 
and fiber (Getting Broadband, 2016). This gap in service could equate to gaps in opportunity 
(Crawford, 2009) especially since job opportunities and information continue to move online 
(US FCC, 2010 p. 129). Research institutes like the Benton Foundation, claim broadband brings 
“economic development, public safety, affordable health care, educational opportunities, and 
energy efficiency” to communities (Rhinesmith, 2016 p. 4), yet it is unclear how cities measure 
such benefits from broadband. Governments and planners need to determine what the public 
benefits of Internet are and recommend ways for capturing value and deploying the technology 
for all. This thesis works to understand what cities are handing over in the planning process to 
gain such high-speed Internet access and whether the service actually leads to outcomes they 





The most reliable and highest capacity Internet is the fiber optic network. Fiber optics, as a 
technology, is the “science of light transmission through very fine glass [...] fibers” and the result 
is extremely high-speeds when compared to Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) cables (Massa, 2012). 
There are three general ways in which fiber can be installed throughout a city: below ground, 
ground level, and above ground (Burrington, 2016). Below ground methods for fiber optic 
infrastructure include trenching, micro-trenching, as well as running through existing conduit 
(Burrington, 2016). Ground level includes junction boxes as well as carrier centers, and above 
ground are usually pole and structure attachments (Burrington, 2016). In the US, DSL services 
provide a maximum speed of 6 megabits per second (Mbps) (Kolko, 2010) however, cities with 
at-home fiber connections are able to provide speeds at least up to 1 gigabit per second (Gbps) 
via fiber optic Internet, exponentially faster than traditional networks (McMahon, 2012 p. 9). 
Table 1 provides a description of speed tiers and their relevance to the telecommunications 
regulatory market.  
Table 1: Relative Internet Speeds 
Speed  Relevance  
56 kilobits/second (Kbps) highest attainable speed from dial-up modem  
200 Kbps  Minimum speed to be considered “high-speed” according to FCC 
768 Kbps Minimum speed for an area that is “served” according to ARRA  
1.5 megabits/second (Mbps)  Average speed provided by DSL and cable services  
6 Mbps  Highest speed tier offered by DSL services  
10 Mbps  Minimum speed offered by Chattanooga  
100 Mbps  Lowest speed offered by Google Fiber and other fiber providers such  as EPB, 
National Broadband Plan goal speed by 2020  
1,000 Mpbs/1 Gbps Highest speeds offered in Provo and Kansas City  
10 Gbps Highest speed offered in Chattanooga 
 
 




Fiber is coupled with a series of advantages including increased bandwidth, lower loss of signal 
intensity, heightened security, and general safety when compared to traditional metal conductors 
(Massa, 2012). These advantages are embedded in the wiring of these cables throughout the city, 
stressing the matter that the implementation of a fiber optic network is a hard infrastructure 
project. This means that city council approvals, building permits, contractors, franchise licenses, 
and other building processes are all required. With all of these necessary approvals, it is clear 
that the fiber optic infrastructure process is a planning issue, and access to city-wide 
infrastructural services to the general public is of primary concern to the planning discipline.   
 
Across the world, the sentiment that Internet is important to human connectivity and opportunity 
has been established through many avenues. Perhaps this is best exemplified by the UN Human 
Rights Council when they named access to the Internet a basic human right in June 2016 (Oral, 
2016). In the resolution signed by more than 70 countries, it was determined that any state that 
disrupts a citizen’s access to Internet is automatically condemned by the international 
organization (Oral, 2016). While the disruption of access is not directly related to this thesis, it 
serves an important role in cementing the vitality of connectivity.  
 
During the Obama administration, broadband access was at the foundation of a strong national 
economic policy (US Office of Science, 2013). A 2012 White House report stated “the build-out 
of broadband infrastructure itself is a major driver of American investment and job creation” (US 
Office of Science, 2013). In 2015, it was estimated that the administration deployed or upgraded 




since President Obama took office in 2009 (Zients, 2015). Much of this uptake in broadband 
adoption has been facilitated by the National Broadband Plan, released in 2010 which aims to 
provide affordable Internet at speeds of 100 Mbps to at least 100 million homes by 2020. The 
plan highlights the importance of Internet to innovation, investment, and inclusion (US FCC, 
2010). Federal investment in broadband networks was also a major component to the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 stimulus funding package which gave $7.2 
billion to localities who sought to build high-speed Internet networks (Civic, 2017). In 2015, the 
administration formed the Broadband Opportunity Council to address broadband adoption in 
underserved communities (Zients, 2015).  
 
Despite these efforts, urban planners have left the world of telecommunication systems largely to 
the private sector. Broadband implementation has been mostly driven by the thirst for profit, 
leaving service gaps in geographies that are usually the most in need (Crawford, 2009, p. 263). 
According to the National Broadband Plan, “digital exclusion compounds inequities for 
historically marginalized groups” (US FCC, 2010 p. 129). Not only are vulnerable populations 
left unconnected, but those who are connected rely on much slower connections (US FCC, 2010 
p. 48). Crawford contends that federal and state policies set forth by the US government 
consistently favor a handful of private Internet providers, subsequently creating natural 
monopolies that result in subpar quality services at high costs to consumers (Crawford, 2009). 
Intense lobbying paid by telecommunications companies results in consumer prices left to the 
hands of the few providers in their area and there is little incentive for technological upgrades in 




competition is the answer to capturing the technological advances of the Internet into our service 
provider markets (Crawford, 2009). As a result, many cities across the United States are taking 
the responsibility for high-speed connections into their own hands and have developed creative 
solutions to provide such services to their constituents.  
 
The regulation and deregulation of the telecommunications industry at the federal level dates 
back several decades and is possibly the most determinant element in the formation of these 
natural monopolies. Specifically, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is the most cited in 
today’s regulatory schemes. The Act, signed into law by President Bill Clinton, was the first 
instance Internet was included in the provision of telecommunications in the US 
(Telecommunications, 2013). The goal of the Act was to “let any communications business 
compete in any market against any other” (Telecommunications, 2013, p.1).  To do so, the 1996 
Act created competition among telecommunication markets by eliminating barriers to entry such 
as allowing cross-market mergers and forcing existing providers to open their circuits to 
competitors (Crawford, 2009). The deregulation immediately led to the conglomeration of 
companies resulting in larger and much more powerful monopolistic powers in the industry 
(Crawford, 2009). This unfortunately resulted in outcomes that went against the Act’s claimed 
intent to work in the public interest for equitable telecommunications services and continues to 
be the backbone for which these companies operate their flexible pricing schemes on.  
 
The FCC has long debated whether to treat Internet as a utility rather than a service, a technical 




coined by Columbia Law Professor, Tim Wu, in 2003, meaning “a maximally useful public 
information network [which] aspires to treat all content, sites, and platforms equally” (Wu, 
2003). The stakeholders affected include the Internet providers, such as AT&T and Comcast who 
believe that they should be able to deploy flexible pricing mechanisms for use of their 
infrastructures, and content providers, who believe such practices would be harmful to the “free 
and open Internet” (Hahn and Wallsten 2006). Before the topic was brought to the FCC, Internet 
services were categorized as an “information service,” however, after the US Court of Appeals 
ruled in favor of net neutrality in 2016, the FCC could now categorize Internet services under 
Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1934 (FCC 15-24). Title II meant Internet would be 
considered a telecom service, and would now be treated and regulated as a utility (Hahn and 
Wallsten 2006). The net neutrality ruling supports the “open Internet” principle, meaning access 
to content will continue to be democratically available. Furthermore, this ruling has had 
implications on how localities plan for Internet infrastructures. For example, municipal Internet 
providers may claim Internet as a “telecom service,” therefore it is within their right as 
municipalities, to provide the utility for their constituents, effectively circumventing large 
providers (Crawford, 2009). This notion of Internet as a utility currently stands, however could 
be threatened in the future due to the recent Trump appointment of Ajit Pai to Chairman of the 












This thesis evaluates existing “fiber cities” in the United States and their respective processes for 
implementing fiber optic networks for high-speed Internet services. Since there is currently no 
existing methodology for evaluating the successes of fiber internet services, this thesis will use a 
Comparative Analysis. According to David Collier, Comparative Analysis is “the examination of 
two or more cases in order to highlight how different they are, thus establishing a framework for 
interpreting how parallel process of change are played out in different ways within each context” 
(Collier, 1993, p 108).  
 
Case studies were chosen for the differing ways in which they financed and operated fiber 
Internet. They will serve as representatives of three typical ways of attaining fiber networks. The 
first is Chattanooga, “Type I - Public Investment, Public Operation” next is Kansas City “Type II 
– Private Investment, Private Operation” and the last is Provo, “Type III – Public Investment, 
Private Operation.”  The study comparatively evaluates the individual methodologies and 
partnerships the three aforementioned cities utilized to facilitate this new ‘transportation 
network’ through questions and interviews, as well as the review of relevant contracts, zoning 
ordinances, and building codes. Finally, this thesis discusses not only the effectiveness of these 
uniquely differing implementation processes and partnerships, but evaluates the merits of the 
concessions made in the infrastructural process and asks whether fiber optic implementation does 




the outcomes is crucial to the findings of this study.  
 
The primary method of data collection was document review. There was extensive review into 
all related ordinances, resolutions, contracts and private sector blog announcements that were 
used as the basis for the documentation of each study. This data collection was then 
supplemented with phone interviews from city employees who were involved in the decision-
making processes for each case study. The following people were chosen to be interviewed:  
●   Cindy Circo, Councilwoman for Kansas City, MO from 2007 – 2015, currently Public 
Affairs Manager of Kansas City Power and Light 	  
●   Dixon Holmes, Deputy Mayor of Economic Development at City of Provo since 2013, 
previously City Economic Development Assistant Director 	  
●   Ken Hays, former Chief of Staff from 1997-2000 at City of Chattanooga, now President 
of the Enterprise Center.  	  
In order to maintain consistency among interviews across differing contexts and geographies, 
individuals chosen for the interview were all sent an identical list of questions that provided a 
framework that facilitated discussion. The interview questions were structured in the following 
manner:  
1.   In addition to high-speed Internet access, what did the city hope to gain from a fiber optic 
Internet network?  
2.   Please describe the approval process 
a.   For example, how long did it take? Did existing ordinances need to be altered? 
What was the role of public participation? Was there any stakeholder opposition?  
3.   Since implementation, has there been an ongoing relationship between the city ongoing 




4.   Is the city satisfied with the outcomes and how so?  
5.   It has been x number of years since fiber has been implemented in the city, what does the 
city hope this high-speed Internet will bring in the next 5-10 years?  
 
Together, these answers were synthesized into the analysis in order to create a relative 
understanding of each of the planning processes in the cities. The findings and conclusions will 
be based on the evidence that arises from document review as well as these interviews.  
Limitations of Methodology  
	  
The scope of study and methodology have been limited by data availability. Most notably, 
subscriber data is privately held by Google, making it difficult to understand real adoption rates 
of fiber in the case study cities. This also prohibits this study from making a quantitative analysis 
on the economic benefits of the networks. Further, there is limited data on where fiber is actually 
laid throughout the city which could have given insight as to which parts of the city are favored 
for infrastructural investment. Data on fiber cable locations has been collected by private firm, 
GeoTel, however, the cost made it extremely difficult to attain for the purposes of this study.  
	  




Literature Review  
	  
While there has been a remarkable amount of research on the impacts of Internet on cities, the 
implementation of fiber optic networks specifically has yielded little research. As a result, this 
thesis will take a broad approach to understanding the complexities of local government 
decision-making for city-wide infrastructures as well as researching local economic development 
related to broadband adoption.  
 
Discourse surrounding Internet regulation in the federal realm may be an ingredient that has led 
to existing circumstances and perhaps the most accurate parallel to draw would be from the 
history of cable television. Thomas Streeter’s 1987 piece The Cable Fable Revisited: Discourse, 
Policy, and the Making of Cable Television details how the introduction of cable was discussed 
in the policy arena at the time of its deployment. He argues that the reframing of cable as a vessel 
for democratic and cultural expressions was key in creating alliances among cable Internet 
providers, community organizations, and other entities (Streeter, 1987). Together, they were able 
to push their consensus that cable had to be regulated for the fair entry of the technology into the 
existing market (Streeter, 1987). In fact, before regulation, cable was seen as a threat to existing 
telephone companies and was constantly being mistreated in the market. For example, “phone 
companies used their control over pole [attachments] to gouge cable systems, often by doubling 
or tripling the rates they charged electrical utilities and other phone companies (Crawford, 2009, 
p.40). This led to federal regulation which demanded equal access in order to enable the new 
technology to enter the market (Crawford, 2009). Cable, as a result became federally regulated as 




the deep cooperation of different government levels could follow a similar trajectory and develop 
analogous alliances.     
 
The debut of traditional broadband also marked the operational shift of many industries in the 
United States as described by Van den Besselaar and Koizumi in Digital Cities III (Van den 
Besselaar, 2005). The authors understand that the landscape for Internet was set by the transition 
from an American industrial society to the information age in the 1970s-80s (Van den Besselaar, 
2005). This piece argues that this new era brought innovative technologies which were 
supporting new industries and became economic drivers for cities. The authors detailed how the 
way information was now processed radically minimized distance between people, places, and 
goods. This was echoed in the FCC’s 2010 National Broadband Plan, it was stated, “like 
railroads and highways, broadband accelerates the velocity of commerce, reducing the costs of 
distance” (US FCC, 2010 p.3). Van den Besselaar and Koizumi’s work highlight how Internet 
have restructured the way cities operate in terms of goods and services as well as the movement 
of information.  
 
The deployment of information throughout the local level is also critical to comprehend, 
especially for decisions related to infrastructure. Foundationally, local governments should make 
decisions based on rational evidence (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Bent Flyvbjerg explains in Rationality 
and Power: Democracy in Practice, that planning processes are disarrayed by the relationships 
between the knowledge local governments attain and the power they hold (Flyvbjerg, 1998).  




acknowledges that this holds true, he adds conversely that also, “Power is knowledge” (p. 319). 
Therefore, from Flybjerg’s perspective, “power determines what counts as knowledge […] and 
power procures the knowledge that supports its purposes, while it ignores or suppresses that 
knowledge which does not serve it” (1998 p. 319). Perhaps a local government decides that fiber 
Internet service is advantageous for its respective public interests, therefore those in power 
would only work to obtain knowledge which supports policies in favor of Google Fiber. This 
property of power may have informed the decisions made to invest in fiber. With management 
that facilitates entry for private Internet providers into their markets, Flyvbjerg’s work suggests 
that the local government’s power can be molded to fit its own purposes. The evidence to 
support fiber optic infrastructure is limited, therefore the rationale these cities base decisions on 
is unclear. Flyvbjerg continues that in many cases institutions which work in the public interest 
“were revealed to be deeply embedded in the hidden exercise of power and the protection of 
special interests” (p. 321). These factors affect decision-making at almost every level and are 
important to consider in the financing and operation of city-wide infrastructures.  
 
While the reasoning may be ambiguous, the term economic development has become 
synonymous with the impacts of broadband on cities. In a study conducted by Jed Kolko in the 
Journal of Urban Economics, a positive relationship was found between broadband expansion 
and local economic growth, specific to information technology industries (Kolko, 2010). 
Through an analysis using FCC national broadband data, the study also found that the 
relationship between local economic growth and broadband is stronger in areas with lower 




impactful in suburban and rural contexts with emphasis on tech industries. The study also alludes 
to the danger of broadband plans as “place-based policies” which means that residents and 
businesses in certain areas benefit regardless, ignoring the basis of individual need (Kolko, 
2010).  If cities are investing or waiving public monies, the benefit of the technology shouldn’t 
be concentrated in areas that are already well-serviced. Rather, they should aim for complete 
coverage with specific regard for suburban and rural contexts. Access to Internet also has deep 
social equity questions embedded in it. The “digital divide” can best be articulated as 
“geographic inequalities in availability to gaps in broadband adoption owing to income, 
race/ethnicity, edition or other inequalities in access or skills that affect the ability of individuals 
or businesses to take advantage of broadband capabilities” (Kolko, 2010 p. 11). The term is 
ambiguous in its breadth, but it implies racial, socioeconomic, and other inequalities that can 
lead to loss of opportunity due to a lack of information (Gunkel, 2003).  
 
There is little consensus on how urban planners manage broadband; however, a piece produced 
by the American Planning Association attempts to create a framework that planners should 
follow to achieve sound and equitable infrastructure. The study states that there are “Four Cs” for 
Broadband Planning: Connectivity, Contact, Capacity, and Challenges (McMahon, 2012). The 
first “C,” Connectivity, varies throughout different contexts since existing infrastructures or 
conduits may be insufficient for connecting homes, businesses, and institutions, but achieving 
full connectivity is vital to productivity and equity (McMahon, 2012). Contact, according to the 
study is about achieving adoption which stems from creating an informed public in a “bottom 




will affect how its infrastructure is developed” (p. 8). This means that capital infrastructure fiber 
network projects need a knowledgeable public to support and progress Internet projects to 
completion. The third “C,” Capacity, is a term used to understand speeds of information to the 
user, and is usually a measure in the unit of megabytes per second (Mbps). Available speeds are 
important to understand at what rate users can receive information. The last “C” which is 
Challenge, stands for the challenges that arise with the private sector as well as funding that have 
led the US to fall behind in Internet infrastructure. The article argues that the first step to 
confronting those challenges is by “bringing broadband into the infrastructure daylight” (p. 9). 
By framing Internet access as an infrastructural need to the general public, fiber can be grouped 
into an area of investment that is deemed necessary for vibrant communities.   
 
All of these concepts are important to shaping the analysis section of this thesis. The areas 
covered in case studies will draw on questions of discourse, power, economic development and 










Chapter 3: Case Studies 
	  
This study is framed on three archetypal ways in which cities have financed fiber Internet 
infrastructures and each case study serves as a representative of each type. These types were 
developed for the purposes of this study.  
Type I: Public Investment, Public Operation 
Type II: Private Investment, Private Operation 
Type III: Public Investment, Private Operation 
 
Chattanooga   
	  
Chattanooga will serve as Type I, “Public Infrastructure, Public Operation” for the purposes of 
this thesis. As a case study, this scenario uncovers the extensive regulatory cooperation at 
different levels of government needed to finance municipal fiber networks. Secondly, this case 
study exhibits that although competition was limited in Chattanooga, conflicts with traditional 
Internet service providers are still prevalent and costly to municipal projects, meaning risk was 
high. The case study also suggests that the benefits of the network were transformative for the 
city, but those benefits may not be derived solely from the technology itself, but rather from a 
combination of other factors. 	  
Type I: Public Investment, Public Operation  
 
Chattanooga Type I: Public Investment, Public Operation is also known as the municipal fiber 
network. In this fully public model, the public sector takes on all risk for the infrastructure 
including finance, operations, and retail (Lucey, 2016). This strategy of fiber Internet production 
and operation has been used in cities across the nation such as Lafayette, Louisiana, Wilson, 




Type I, publicly owned utility boards that are already providing electricity services petition to 
build the fiber optic networks necessary to deploy fiber Internet throughout their service area 
(Mitchell, 2012). Type I networks have historically been faced with lawsuits from existing 
private providers, difficulties in construction and pole attachments, and heavy state regulations 
that work in favor of the large corporate powers in the industry (Mitchell, 2012). In spite of these 
challenges, municipal networks do succeed, and as reported by the Institute of Local Self 
Reliance, a municipal fiber network advocate group, “these community-owned networks are 
generally faster, more reliable, and cheaper than private carriers -- and provide better customer 
service” (Crawford, 2009, p. 256). While successful initiatives yield these types of results, it 
must be acknowledged that the fully-public model is contextual. Aspects such as density, 
geography, and bureaucratic structures, to name a few are the indicators that are determinants of 
whether Type I is the correct choice for a municipality (Lennett, 2014).   
 
There are many reasons why cities opt for Type I initiatives. First is the belief that the state and 
federal government will not adequately address technological progression (Why, 2017). For 
years, higher governments have been restricting telecommunications including Internet which is 
heavily lobbied by existing providers such as AT&T and Comcast, to discourage competition 
(Crawford, 2009). Cities may also opt for Type I networks because of ISPs’ unwillingness to 
invest in rural, less populated areas (Why, 2017). It is less cost-effective for providers to expand 
to low-density areas because subscriber fees would not be adequate to satisfy return rates for 
large corporations (Why, 2017). On the other hand, cities taking on Type I may view investment 




local issues often yields better results since that level knows the specific areas of concern well. 
(Why, 2017). The response to these concerns could be similar to the onset of electricity more 
than a century ago, in which local governments had to interfere in order to gain affordable access 
for their people (Mitchell, 2012). With the private sector unwilling to provide equitable and 
reliable electricity service, 3,300 localities stepped forward to develop public power systems at 
the time (Mitchell, 2012). This is a similar pattern to the Type I method of producing fiber 
infrastructures. 
  
Barriers to Type I include state regulations that prohibit localities from providing Internet 
services. Currently, there are nineteen states that have regulations in place that prohibit or make 
the production of municipal Internet service providers extremely difficult such as state video 
franchising laws and municipal utility expansion laws (James, 2016).  
Background   
	  
Chattanooga, TN is home to 
the Electric Power Board 
(EPB), Hamilton County’s 
municipal utility company, 
which began providing fiber 
Internet to homes in 2010 
(Mitchell, 2012). The City has 
a population of 174,000 
people and a median household income of $40,177 (Figure 1) according to 2015 ACS 5-year 




estimates (US Census Bureau, 2016). “Gig City,” as it’s called, is able to provide fiber services 
because of its Messna Smart Grid system which has the capacity to deploy Internet speeds higher 
than any other city in America (Mitchell, 2012). Today, EPB provides fiber Internet access to 
more than 83,000 homes (Murphy, 2016) at a cost of $58 per month for minimum 100 Mbps of 
speed (EPB, 2017). EPB reaches all of Hamilton County, and portions of five other counties in 
Tennessee as well as three counties in Georgia (NARUC v. EPB, 2015). The system has capacity 
to reach up to 10 Gb connections, (EPB, 2017) making it 100 times faster than the 100 Mbps 
goal outlined in the National Broadband Plan (US FCC, 2010).  
Implementation 
 
The road to at-home fiber connections in Chattanooga was not the simplest. EPB utility board, 
established in 1935, provided electricity to its 600 square mile service area until it began 
expanding into telecommunications in 1996 (About EPB, 2017). City Resolution No. 96-08 
served as the official declaration of “a letter of intent to enter into an agreement for development 
of a fiber optic network and to contract for professional services” (Chattanooga Res 96-08 p. 1). 
The initial expression to finance a fiber optic network was not for the intent of Internet, rather it 
was based on the needs to upgrade the EPB distribution system for “load control, remote 
switching, remote monitoring and substation automation” (Chattanooga Res 96-08 p. 1). The 
Resolution passed and along the same time the Tennessee General Assembly ruled to allow 
municipal electric systems to provide telecommunication but not Internet and video services, 
(EPB-FCC, 2016). In 1997, EPB began venturing into becoming a telephone provider for 
businesses, a simpler transition into the telecommunications, since businesses were clustered 





EPB’s quest to become a retail Internet provider to businesses necessitated public approval 
processes and a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity (CCN). After rigorous public approval 
processes mandated under Tennessee Code 7-52-601, EPB obtained the Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity (CCN) which says that public service companies should make their 
services available on “fair and equitable terms to all customers in the area it undertakes to serve” 
(Jones, 1979, p. 428). Comparatively, the public service company is permitted to charge 
consumers enough to cover operating costs as well as a predetermined return on investment 
(Jones, 1979). There was also vast opposition for EPB’s entry into the telecommunications 
network, most of which was led by Tennessee Cable Telecommunications Association (TCTA) 
(US LEC, 2005). In court, TCTA argued that “EPB had a ‘substantial amount of goodwill and 
name recognition developed with those electric ratepayers” leading to an unfair advantage within 
the market (US LEC, 2005 p. 3). Essentially they wanted the company to stop using its own 
name. The General Assembly rejected the claims and allowed municipal electric systems to 
provide Internet and video to businesses within its service areas.  
 
With the regulatory backing and approvals in place, EPB began exploring expansions to 
residential services and the Smart Grid connection. In 2007, the EPB Board of Directors 
announced the Fiber to the Home (FTTH) Plan, which would deploy fiber Internet services to 
residential properties for the first time (Mitchell, 2012).  This plan was the fruition of EPB’s 
vision, an attitude for the community best summarized by Harold DePriest, former CEO of EPB 





“I think [EPB was] created because this new technology was available and 
the people of Chattanooga needed some organization to master that technology 
for their benefit. In those days it was electric networks and motors and things like 
that. But as the technology changes, the same issues are there...if it fits that 
classification of eventually being a public utility, in the sense of something that 
everybody needs, then organizations like us have not just a right, but a 
responsibility to step up and provide that for our community” (Mitchell, 2012, p. 
32). 
 
DePriest was also concerned with community 
involvement in the process. In a report by Chris 
Mitchell, it was found when FTTH was being 
decided, EPB identified “23 community leaders 
spread across the government and business 
community and scheduled meetings with the leaders 
they believed were most likely to oppose it” 
(Mitchell, 2012). It was found that these community 
leaders were actually supportive of the project and 
with the support of public agencies and community 
leaders, the Utility Board went public. Public 
meetings were required as a part of Tennessee Law, 
but DePriest argued that the utility went even further 
with their public approval processes. He stated, “If you don’t have the support of your public, 
Figure 2: Chattanooga Steps for Approval for 





why would you want to do it?” (Mitchell, 2012, p. 33). When presenting at public meetings, EPB 
presented three benefits to the community “modernizing the electric system, economic 
development, and superior triple play services” (Mitchell, 2012, p. 33). There was general 
concern over the losses that would occur if the project failed, however the strong visioning for 
the future of the community seemed to prevail in the public process. Figure 2 lists out the 
necessary approvals the Public Utility had to seek in order to be permitted a residential Internet 
service provider.  
 
Almost a full year later, the Chattanooga City Council unanimously approved the FTTH 
initiative which issued electric system revenue bonds of $220 million for the construction of a 
Smart Grid as well as other electric system upgrades (About EPB, 2017). The Smart Grid is used 
for monitoring energy use which yields efficiency and uses smart meters to inform users when to 
reduce their energy usage (McMahon, 2012). It has also been widely found that these 
technologies “can pay for [themselves] in a few years through reduced electrical service outages” 
especially in weather related incidents (McMahon, 2012, p.9). $169 million of the bond was used 
for the capital costs of the Smart Grid, which would permeate high-speed Internet throughout the 
city (EPB-FCC, 2016). In 2009, at the depths of the Great Recession, EPB was granted $111 
million from the Department of Energy as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
to facilitate the build-out of the Smart Grid (EPB-FCC, 2016). In 2010, fiber Internet speeds up 
to 150 Mbps was available to almost all residences in Chattanooga (Our, 2017). Refer to Figure 3 










The case of Chattanooga reveals partial thought processes in decision-making for fiber services. 
In an interview with Ken Hays, he expressed that what he hopes people realize is that “the whole 
reason for deploying fiber was not to give us the fastest Internet in the world, it was to make our 
Smart Grid the smartest in the world” (Hays, Personal Communication, 2017).  He went on to 
say that the extensive Internet coverage and speeds was a “by-product” of that Smart Grid. 
Before the construction of the Smart Grid, residents and even those at EPB were concerned over 




alternatives were considered but were soon to be dismissed since it was found that the natural 
topography of Chattanooga would make wireless costlier and would be overall less reliable. In 
accordance with this, the Tennessee Valley Authority and Electric Power Research Institute 
found that the long-term benefits of fiber were to outweigh the costs (Mitchell, 2012).  
 
It could also be argued that a by-product of the system was large-scale coverage across socio-
economic status. All homes that were within the electric service area were equipped with fiber 
capabilities, see Figure 4 for the full coverage of the network. For those in which the monthly 
charge proved to be a hardship, the city agency, Enterprise Center, currently run by Ken Hays, 
introduced the Tech Goes Home plan. This program works to bridge the digital divide by 
offering subsidized connection rates to homes, selling Chromebooks for $50 and even providing 




computer skills training for free (About Tech, 2017). 	  
 
There is no clear way of understanding economic benefit from the network. The estimation of 
value created from the network has been widely disputed. In his interview, Ken Hays cited a 
series of incoming businesses and Chattanooga as a place for expertise tourism (Hays, Personal 
Communication, 2017). Expertise tourism, in this context refers to the increased tourism that 
may arise from those who are in fields with particular involvement with high-capacity networks 
and would like to learn from Chattanooga. He’s seen businesses expand their operations in 
Chattanooga as well as new business models such as incubators. When asked whether the city 
keeps its own metrics for incoming businesses and created value of the network, Ken Hays said, 
“we probably don’t do as good a job of doing that right now as we should, but anecdotally we are 
seeing it and changing it, and that’s not one of our strategies” (Hays, Personal Communication, 
2017). 
 
 A study commissioned by EPB conducted by the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga 
worked to provide quantitative values to the question of benefit. The study found that “over the 
period 2011-2015, the fiber infrastructure has generated incremental and social benefits ranging 
from $865.3 million to $1.3 billion while additionally creating between 2,800 and 5,200 new 
jobs” (Lobo, 2015, p. 3). This study, however has been discredited for apparent bias in its 
surveying methods and lack of data to support its claims. The study concludes by saying its 
analysis is “incomplete mostly because there does not currently exist a holistic theory to guide 




of a lack of data at the local level, and sometimes even at the national level, and a dearth of 
metrics to capture the value of high-speed Internet connectivity” (Lobo, 2015, p. 65).  
 
Additionally, the Chattanooga example illustrates the vulnerability cities place themselves in 
when it comes to supporting fiber Internet providers. The City of Chattanooga’s transparent 
support for the municipal project made them adversaries to existing Internet providers, making 
themselves vulnerable to lawsuits. Existing providers are usually the lobbyists behind state 
regulation against municipalities who want to expand (Crawford, 2009) therefore, municipalities 
are at a disadvantage and it costs them a great amount. Once the City had approved funding of 
the network in Chattanooga, objections began. It was reported that there were more than 2,600 
television ads taken out as an effort to garner residents to oppose the EPB project (Mitchell, 
2012). In 2009, EPB faced another lawsuit from TCTA in which they contended that it was out 
of the Board’s scope to fund the Internet network (TCTA, 2009). This suit was dismissed and 
this decision was also affirmed by the Tennessee Court of Appeals (TCTA, 2009). Almost eight 
days later, Comcast also filed a suit against the municipal provider on the grounds that EPB was 
“violating Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-52-603 by improperly using municipal electric utility funds to 
subsidize its recent cable/Internet venture” (Comcast, 2009 p. 2). This suit was also dismissed 
however it was estimated that the defense of these lawsuits cost EPB almost $500,000 in legal 
fees (NARUC, 2015).  
 
Since every challenge has been knocked down, it has established that it is within municipalities’ 




electric service area was upheld by the FCC (NARUC, 2015). The FCC found the ruling to be in 
according with Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act that the state law impediments to 
expanding Internet utilities would block market entry for municipal broadband and stifle 
competition in the area (NARUC, 2015). As a result, the FCC ruled that municipal broadband 
should be allowed to expand beyond their authoritative territories, making it easier for more 
people to gain Internet access and promote healthy competition in the Internet arena. However, 
most recently the states of Tennessee and North Carolina appealed that decision saying that the 
FCC has no authority to overrule or change state laws (NARUC, 2016). The US Court of 
Appeals sided with the states and state laws effectively have blocked any municipal Internet 
utility from further expanding outside of its service area (NARUC, 2016) 
 
EPB’s halt on expansion has been a decision that has sparked controversy among the broadband 
field. The questionability of state government decision-making was brought up again most 
recently with the passing of HB0529 or the Broadband Accessibility Act of 2017. Passed by the 
Tennessee State Legislature and signed by the Governor on April 24, 2017, the bill agrees to give 
$45 million in taxpayer money to private ISPs specifically for the expansion of services to rural 
areas (HB0529, 2017). The expansion of private networks with public taxpayer subsidy is a 
decision with unfound logic, especially when directly juxtaposed with EPB’s desire to expand to 
those rural areas at no cost to taxpayers but rather with money available on-hand (Koebler, 
2017).   
 




societal benefits of their fiber network within its city. Not only is the City able to provide 
equitable access to Internet, but it is also less prone to city-wide power outages and have become 
a site for expertise tourism. From the City’s perspective, even though the risks were high, the 
aforementioned costs do not outweigh the benefits. Table 2 summarizes what the network cost 
the City and what the City has gained.  
  
Table 2: Costs and Benefits of Fiber in Chattanooga 
Costs Benefits 
-   $220 million secured ($120 in bonds, 
$111 in ARRA funds)  
-   Claims of economic development  
  
-   High risk for utility because used 
electric system revenue as security for 
bond  
-   Smart Grid makes for most reliable intra-
city communications and also allowed for 
highest speed capacity 
-   Years of lawsuits with existing ISPs 
estimating at least $500,000 in legal 
fees 
-   International recognition and press for the 
project    
   -   Bridging digital divide through education 
and pricing subsidy programs and large 
area coverage 
   -   FCC backed EPB as providing services 
within the scope of the municipal utility   
 
Kansas City, MO  
	  
The second case for this research framework is Kansas City, MO which serves as “Type II: 
Private Infrastructure, Private Operation.” This thesis will focus on the implementation and 
outcomes of the Missouri side of Kansas City since the negotiations on the Kansas side were 
confidential. The case study suggests that Kansas City has compromised largely to Google in 




the existing “digital divide” in their city and fully harness the economic development they hoped 
to attain. The study also suggests that the level of risk for the municipality was low due to the 
type of partnership utilized.   
Type II: Private Investment, Private Operation  
 
The Private Investment, Private Operation model is the second type to be developed for this 
study. This Type may initially be thought to be entirely private as its name implies; however, 
these projects need significant cooperation from the government. For cities that do not choose a 
Type I municipal network for the aforementioned risks, they turn to Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP) (Lucey, 2016). The discourse around PPPs varies among contexts, but Type II illustrates 
what MuniNetworks refers to as “private-led investment with public support” type of partnership 
(Lucey, 2016, p.7).  The study states that in these types of PPPs, public sector is “very limited” 
in its abilities to influence the project and there is “no substantive oversight by the public” 
(Lucey, 2016, p. 7). As a result, the public sector generally concedes to the demands of the 
private entity, especially if the project is largely supported by the general public (Lucey, 2016). 
This type draws parallels to the Kansas City case study.  
 
This degree of PPP draws parallels to the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) mechanism which is 
most commonly used for financing transportation infrastructures. BOTs “are agreements in 
which private parties recover costs and turn a profit for a predetermined period of time before the 
project is wholly transferred over to government” (Manzo IV, 2014 p. 2). In this model, the 
private entity is guaranteed to get back its original investment and the city receives technological 




on by the private entity for completing the project, however this model “opens up opportunities 
for contractors to penetrate an expanding market for infrastructure projects [...] with reduced 
government involvement” (Algarni, 2007, p. 5). This model has been used to finance large-scale 
infrastructures such as the Bangkok Mass Transit System (BOT, 2008) and even the Suez Canal 
in 1854 (Levy, 1996). 
 
An example of BOT is the first deployment of the parking meter in Oklahoma City as described 
in Donald Shoup’s book, The High Cost of Free Parking. Shoup explains that when the parking 
meter was introduced to Oklahoma City in 1935, “cities were initially unsure how the monitoring 
public would react to the new meters” (Shoup, 2011 p. 441). With Oklahoma City’s 
unwillingness to pay for the technology, the manufacturer of the meters installed them at no cost 
to the city and collected the revenue from the meters until their investment was recovered 
(Shoup, 2011). After the costs in the BOT exchange were recouped, ownership of the meters was 
then transferred to the public sector. In BOTs, “the private investment will involve almost no 
risk, and the benefit districts will require no public subsidy” (Shoup, 2011 p. 441). This degree of 
partnership is mostly privately-led with the local government’s support and the general public 
utilizing the needed technology.           
 
Barriers to Type II include state regulations that would dissuade private investment. There are 
also regulations that are indirectly related such as environmental review regulations, which are 
usually timely and costly to these projects and the impacts of which are unlikely related to the 




for Google Fiber said, “many fine California city proposals for the Google Fiber project were 
ultimately passed over in part because of the regulatory complexity here brought about by CEQA 
and other rules” (Committee, 2011, p.3). State laws can obstruct entry into markets and will be 
considered in the case study implementations of Google Fiber.  
Background  
 
Kansas City, Kansas was chosen to be 
the site of the first Google Fiber 
endeavor in 2011and its counterpart in 
Missouri was chosen in the months 
afterwards to be the second (Medin, 
2011). KCMO, as the Missouri side is 
called, has a population of about 
460,000 people and a household median 
income of $45,821 (Figure 4) (US 
Census Bureau, 2016). KCMO utilities 
are privately owned by Kansas City 
Power and Light whereas they are publicly owned on the Kansas side. In 2011, the City made a 
Type II agreement with private entity, Google Fiber, for a privately financed fiber optic 
infrastructure system in addition to the private operation of that service for a ten-year term 
agreement with a five-year renewal option (Development, 2011). Today, Fiber passes through 
more than 200,000 households in Kansas City, MO (McGee, 2015). With the cooperation of the 
local city government and little state involvement, the private operator has had the opportunity to 




implement large scale infrastructure projects over the large land mass of the city’s area. This 




The Google Fiber process began in 2010 when Google announced its first venture into the fiber 
optic network business, suitably named Google Fiber (Medin, 2011). With the financial 
resources and aptitude for the technology secure, the company launched a national campaign to 
determine which US city would be the first recipient of this all-encompassing infrastructure 
project. This competition framework yielded about 
1,100 applicants and garnered massive press when it 
came to determining which city the tech giant would 
lay cables in first (Ordinance 110390). This scheme 
effectively flipped the traditional utility services 
model. Instead of private entities competing against 
one another for a contract, cities were now competing 
against each other for one provider as shown in 
Figure 5. This competition inherently led to many 
cities willing to relinquish most of their bargaining power over the provider.  
 
After review, Kansas City, KS was selected in 2011, becoming the first city selected to receive 
Google Fiber services, which included building the fiber infrastructure as well as operating the 
subscription service. While the selection was specific to Kansas, the Missouri side of the city 
Figure 6: Difference in Bid Models. Adapted 




also looked to attracting Google’s attention. Before the selection of its counterpart, KCMO 
passed two resolutions expressing support to go for the bid, Resolution No. 100174 and 
Resolution No. 100250. The first was in “support of the City Manager’s efforts to encourage 
Google to set up a high-speed network in Kansas City” (Resolution 100174, p.1) and the second 
was established to express “support for the GoogleKC Fiber for Communities RFI Coalition’s 
response to Google’s RFI (Resolution 100250, p.1). The Missouri side would become the next 
Google Fiber serviced area seven months later (Lo, 2012).  
 
The GoogleKC Fiber for Communities effort was led by Cindy Circo, Kansas City 
Councilwoman from 2007 to 2015. In an interview with Ms. Circo, she explained the coalition 
was the result of a series of private entity groups hoping to attract Google Fiber to Missouri, 
which she correctly pointed out, would have been unable to win the bid since they eventually 
needed the City’s cooperation. Therefore, Ms. Circo channeled all of these small community 
groups into one streamlined focus group that worked on a collective Google Doc for the contract 
with Google Fiber. Over 100 people worked on the Doc through a series of meetings and 
iterations of the application. She recalled, “going to those meetings and being surrounded by the 
excitement and engagement, to watch them all pull that together in one single document was 
amazing” (Circo, Personal Communication, 2017). Throughout these meetings, Ms. Circo 
expressed that her project was at times met with skepticism, “I had people saying, ‘why are you 
wasting your time, this isn’t real, this is a Google stunt.’ There were cities changing their names. 
They didn’t realize this was a serious thing” (Circo, Personal Communication, 2017). After 




was assessed in the outcomes section of this thesis.  
 
During implementation, there were initiatives in learning how to leverage the incoming networks 
to optimize results. Along the time of implementation, the Mayors of KCMO and KCKS 
compiled a Bi-State Innovation Team made up of community leaders in tech, education, urban 
planning, and policy (Playing, 2012). In their report, the team specified they were “developing a 
playbook of creative ways the community can use Google Fiber to spark economic development, 
advance opportunities, and improve daily life in Kansas City” (Playing, 2012, p. 3). The result 
was the Player Handbook which revolved around the statement “A successful Internet economy 
is 90 percent sociology and 10 percent technology” (Playing, 2012, p.4).  Kansas City made clear 
attempts to leverage the power of the increased capacity. The Playbook also made a strong call 
for equity, stating, “if digital inclusion […] is not the first plank in the community’s digital 
platform, the opportunity for true transformation will be constricted, if not lost entirely” 
(Playing, 2012, p.1). This playbook also resulted in recommendations in the City’s efforts to 
create business-friendly environments. Some of the related suggestions were to create Tech 
Districts, partnerships with the local university, and LaunchKC which provides grants for 




The emphasis on why Google Fiber chose Kansas City as the first site of this major infrastructure 
project reveals key themes in the case study and general Google Fiber practices. Primarily, 




KCMO saw Google Fiber as an economic development project. As a result, Ms. Circo wanted to 
show the City through their application 
that they would be “out of [Google’s] 
way” (Circo, Personal Communication, 
2017). This attitude could be an indicator 
of the city’s willingness to amend and 
streamline the traditional regulatory 
framework for these utility services. She 
estimated that the City waived $2 million 
in fees for Google Fiber and went on to 
say “in our application we let them know 
that we saw this as an ability for 
economic development in our city and 
that fees to access our easements and poles was a very small investment for such a large return”	  
(Circo, Personal Communication, 2017).	  From the first network purchase agreement ordinance, 
the City stated that this action served to satisfy an “identifiable public necessity” (Development, 
2011, p. 1). However, it has remained unclear throughout document review what that public 
necessity is, but it is inferred the City means economic development. When asked if there was a 
quantifiable amount they got in return, Circo cited the Kansas City Startup Village, free press to 
generate tourism, as well as highlighting the existing digital divide problem in their city.  
 
A similar “hands off” outlook was reflected at the state level best illustrated by Missouri’s law 




on state-level video franchising passed in 2010 (Statewide, 2014). Prior to this state law, 
providers were forced to negotiate agreements regarding cable trenching and utility pole 
attachments with each city they wanted to serve (Statewide, 2014). In response, in 2005, Texas 
legislation began statewide cable and video franchise laws that would only require one 
negotiated agreement to operate within the entire state (Statewide, 2014). Missouri and Kansas 
took this cue and passed laws for the “immediate availability of state-issued video service 
authorization” in order to “promote fair competition among all video service providers in a local 
market” (Statewide, 2014). This meant that Google Fiber saved time and money when deciding 
to invest in Kansas City and as Milo Medin, Vice President of Access Services at Google pointed 
out, “it’s clear that investment flows into areas that are less affected by regulation than areas that 
are dominated by it” (Committee, 2011, p. 6).  
 
The company itself stated on its blog that one of the reasons Kansas City was chosen for the 
Google Fiber project was because “the City’s leadership and utility moved with efficiency and 
creativity in working with us to craft a real partnership” (Committee, 2011, p.2). During the 
Google Fiber Kansas City Official Announcement event, Milo Medin highlighted similar 
sentiments regarding the decision: 
“We wanted to find a location where we could build quickly and 
efficiently. Kansas City has great infrastructure. And Kansas has a great, 
business-friendly environment for us to deploy a service. The utility here has all 
kinds of conduit in it that avoids us having to tear the streets open and a bunch of 






Medin’s statement implies a city attitude rather than a city policy. While other cities were willing 
to go to great lengths to attract Google, such as tax breaks, amended policies, and even name 
changes, Kansas City did the opposite (Committee, 2011). The City essentially conveyed they 
were willing to grant Google with whatever was necessary to expedite the process. Kansas City 
was willing to change the rules for Google because they may have felt what they were getting in 
return was greater than that from other Internet service providers.  
 
In 2011, at a testimony to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Milo Medin 
made an argument on why current regulation is limiting innovation in America. He attributed the 
problems to three areas of regulation: rights-of-way, pole attachments, and the regulations on 
municipal broadband (Committee, 2011). The first of his concerns was with right-of-way 
regulations, which are easements for public use in which “the city or county does not own the fee 
title to the property underlying the public right-of-way; the abutting property owners have that 
fee title” (Meinig, 2014 p. 7). Rights-of-ways are generally stretched past the roadway and 
include sidewalks (Meinig, 2014) and obtaining these permissions is necessary for the 
development of any broadband infrastructure. Currently, these regulations are determined at the 
local level, forcing private companies to deal with differing circumstances in each locality. 
Medin expressed that these heavily regulated municipal processes, “often result in unreasonable 
fees, anti-investment terms and conditions, and long and unpredictable build-out timeframes” 
(Committee, 2011, p. 2). Google Fiber ensured that such regulations would not stand in the swift 
progress of their network-building. The negotiated contract with KCMO stated that “[the City] 




necessary items for construction work within city right-of-way and in connection with city assets 
or infrastructure. This includes a commitment to review and respond to any documents that 
require approval by City within five (5) working days of submission by Google” (Development, 
2011, p. 6).  
       
Next, Medin cited the complexity of pole attachments as another process which makes the 
deployment of fiber infrastructure more difficult than simply attaching a cable to a pole. He 
explains that “because broadband Internet access services don’t fit into the right regulatory box 
in the Communications Act, we do not have automatic attachment rights” (Committee, 2011 p. 
2). Kansas City was willing to forgo the stipulations associated with such attachments and agreed 
to “provide access to assets and infrastructure, with no charges for such access” (Development, 
2011, p. 6). For comparison, a small license agreement with Mobilitie Investment III, a private 
entity, “to install and maintain a wireless digital data communications system” estimates revenue 
of about $5,400 in Pole Attachment Fees (Ordinance 150087, p. 1). The last barrier to fiber 
which Medin explains is the regulation of municipal broadband. He summarizes this argument 
by stressing the importance of localities and how they “know more about what works for their 
communities than state governments or the federal government do” (Committee, 2011, p. 3). 
 
Parity agreements were also a concern for Kansas City. In her interview, Ms. Circo stated that 
there were other providers who began asking for the same waivers as Google. When asked 
specifically why they were willing to make exceptions for Google, Ms. Circo responded, “well 




and they were helping us starting to address the digital divide which was an issue that we felt had 
a high focus on our city that would now get highlighted” (Circo, Personal Communication, 
2017). However, Ms. Circo later revealed that they were unsuccessful in bridging it and “there 
was a lot more that [Google] could have done” (Circo, Personal Communication, 2017). By 
appealing to community concerns, Google was able to ask for more cost-efficient requests, 
however, this was not unseen by other providers. Ms. Circo explains that “there were some other 
telecom communications companies in the area that wanted to sue us for the same deals that 
Google had. We were like ‘you could do the same things, you could create broadband across the 
community” (Circo, Personal Communication, 2017). She made it clear that equitable access was 
a stipulation to getting the same deals that Google received in the process. She ended the answer 
to that question with, “whatever we did for Google, we did for anybody else” (Circo, Personal 
Communication, 2017). The actual terms of the parity agreements between providers were 
unattainable, therefore direct cost to the city could not be considered, but it can be assumed it 
was substantial. The costs and benefits of the Type II Kansas City case study are summarized in 





Table 3: Costs and Benefits of Fiber in Kansas City 
Costs Benefits 
-   No ownership of network  -   Claims of economic development  
-   No control over design, planning 
implementation of project  
-   Free press and news coverage  
-   $2 million in waived fees -   Unable to bridge the digital divide  
  
-    Parity agreements with other ISPs (cost 
unknown) 
-   Increased competition among ISPs  
-   Unknown if operator will stay after the 
term agreement  
-   Expertise tourism as a result of first Google 
Fiber city   
 
 
Provo, Utah  
	  
Provo, Utah will serve as the third case study, which serves as Type III: Public Investment, 
Private Operation. Google Fiber in Provo suggests that state regulation plays a heavy role in the 
structuring of fiber Internet services operations and as a result, needs to be considered when 
publicly investing in fiber optic networks. The willingness to shift from private operator leases to 
selling to Google Fiber for just $1 suggests that there were other potential benefits for the City in 
a contract with Google. The Google Fiber venture was moderate in risk for the municipality, but 
ended up costing Provo taxpayers more than the assumed benefit the network may have brought.  
Type III: Public Investment, Private Operation  
 
Type III: Public Investment, Private Operation illustrates a type of PPP in which the public 
sector “designs, finances, and owns the [infrastructure] system but private actors operate and 
manage the project” (Manzo IV, 2014 p. 2). City-wide infrastructures are necessary for cities, 




as operators, municipalities may vie for third parties. These types of PPPs, could be summarized 
as “public-led contracting” in which the public sector takes more of the lead when compared to 
Type II partnerships (Lucey, 2016). In relation to broadband, this Type has also been subject to 
state interference. In the Provo case study, which will be analyzed further in this thesis, state 
interference is a major component that led to a Type III model.  
 
The Chicago Skyway is a demonstration of the Type III model. Spanning 7.8 miles, this elevated 
toll road connects the downtown Chicago Loop to I-90 down to the Indiana border (Manzo IV, 
2014). The infrastructure was publicly financed and built in 1958 and was operated and 
maintained by the City of Chicago up until 2004 when an RFQ was put out for operators (Manzo 
IV, 2014). The competitive bid process was decided on in 2005 when the City chose Cintra and 
Macquarie to become the leaseholders of the toll road (Manzo IV, 2014). In the contract, the 
entity agreed to pay a lump sum of $1.83 billion for a 99-year lease on the infrastructure (Project, 
2017). The leaseholders then started the Skyway Concession Company, LLC (SCC) in which 
they became “responsible for all operating and maintenance costs [...] but has the right to all toll 
and concession revenue” (Project, 2017, p.1). In this agreement, the City was able to recoup the 
$855 million debt as well as contribute to the ailing city budget at the time (Manzo IV, 2014). 
Additionally, the private entity upgraded the infrastructure by investing in electronic toll 
collection, which effectively decreased congestion and made an upgrade that the City’s limited 
resources would not allow for (Manzo IV, 2014). In this model, it is important to distinguish that 
the ownership of the infrastructure is usually retained by the City, unlike the Type II model. 






Provo is a city of about 115,00 people with a 
household median income of $41,291 (Figure 7) 
covering a 44.17 mi2 land area (US Census Bureau, 
2016). The City started receiving Google Fiber 
services in 2013 (Finley, 2013). Prior to Google, 
Provo set out to build a municipal fiber network in 
1998 as “a way to connect [the existing 
substations] so they could talk to each other [as 
well as] reroute power a lot quicker” according to 
Dixon Holmes, Deputy Mayor of Economic 
Development at Provo (Holmes, Personal Communication, 2017). By 2001, Provo was able to 
build a “three-ring network” which allowed for intra-city communications and could also serve 
as the foundation for a FTTH Initiative (Davidson, 2014).   
 
Soon, the City began exploring the possibility of extending the system to provide retail Internet 
services as a part of the existing utility system. With this new intent progressing through City 
Council, the project took a turn in 2001 when HB 149 was passed in the state legislature. The 
state law made it virtually impossible for municipalities to run their own telecommunications 
networks and services. HB 149 mandated that municipalities produce positive revenues in their 
first year of operation, forced the municipality to pay taxes on itself like similar private 
providers, and mandated other requirements that would make it inconceivable for Provo to 




operate the network themselves (HB149, 2001). An interview with Deputy Mayor of Economic 
Development, Dixon Holmes, revealed that essentially, the state said “even though 
[municipalities] run their own power company, they cannot run their own fiber company. If they 
want to fund infrastructure, that’s fine but they can’t be in the consumer or retail fiber business” 
(Holmes, Personal Communication, 2017). He went on to say that this really forced the City to 
“shift” its whole model to find private operators in order to exempt the City from the stipulations 
of the state regulation.  
 
Nevertheless, the City persisted in its quest for a fiber optic network and in 2004, Provo financed 
a 20-year $39 million bond, to begin construction on the network (Davidson, 2014). Once the 
build-out was complete, the City struggled with gaining subscribers in order to meet the costs of 
operating the network, and was forced to borrow an extra $1 million from the City itself 
(Davidson, 2014). According to Dixon Holmes, the City had two or three different partners that 
ran the network for a while even though the City continued to own it however “[the operators] 
weren’t able to successfully do it or at least not to the level that the City was expecting or 
wanting according to the agreement” (Holmes, Personal Communication, 2017). In 2013, the 
City sold the iProvo network to Google for $1, ending its ownership of the network and handing 
it off to the private entity.  
Implementation 
 
Negotiations between Google Fiber and Provo were outlined in a series of contracts signed by 
both parties. As part of the negotiation, Google would buy the existing network for just $1 with 




residents for at least seven years (Network, 2013). The provider also promised “free Gigabit 
Internet service to 25 local public institutions like schools, hospitals and libraries,” said Kevin 
Lo, General Manager of Google Fiber (Lo, 2013, p.1). The contract specified that Google Fiber 
would franchise the existing infrastructure for ten years with a five-year renewal option 
(Franchise, 2013). The stated purpose of the Provo-Google exchange in the Franchise Contract is 
as follows:  
“The City has a direct interest in improving the quality of life of its 
citizens through improvements to essential infrastructure and services within its 
boundaries and recognizes that improved access to high-speed broadband services 
would provide substantial value to the City and its citizens” (Franchise, 2013 p. 
1). 
 
In addition to the Franchise Agreement, there was the Asset Purchase Agreement, Network 
Services Agreement, License Agreement, and a Property Resolution that all had to be negotiated.  
The Asset Purchase Agreement was signed on April 16, 2013, in which Provo agreed to sell the 
following to name a few:  
●   “All equipment, fiber optic cabling, etc.  
●   Any Technology and other Intellectual Property Rights  
●   All leases, easements, licenses, occupancy, use agreements and other estates, rights, title 
and interests relating to the business  
●   All rights of seller with respect to restrictions on competition and confidentiality  
●   All books, records, files, data and other materials related to the business  
●   All maps, surveys, copies of title assurances and engineering or architectural plans” 
(Asset 2013 p.6).   
 
Additionally, the Pole Attachment and Conduit Occupancy agreement specified that Google will 
need attachments for “any sort necessary or desirable for [Google Fiber] to operate its businesses 
as such business may evolve, develop, or change” (Structure, 2013). Essentially, this gave free 




required expedited review of permits (Network, 2013, p. 6) as well as assistance in accessing 
private rights-of-way (Asset, 2013, p. 8).    
Outcomes 
 
The Provo project has had a series of implications for the question of what the City gave up and 
what it may have received in return. First, the City gave up ownership of a network that it 
invested in and built itself. Dixon Holmes expressed that when they were embarking on this 
journey, “there was hope of somehow selling the assets, the fiber, the network operation center, 
the fiber huts, the nodes and all that selling it to Google and maybe making some money, well 
not to make money but just pay ourselves back for our expenses” (Holmes, Personal 
Communication, 2017). However, in practice, the negotiation hung in the balance of Google 
Fiber and as a result, the City could not recoup any of its costs and now must levy that loss on its 
residents. In order to pay the debt that Google would 
not pay for in the purchase price, the City will levy on 
a $5.35 per month utility tax on electricity bills 
(iProvo, 2011).	   Additionally, commercial customers 
will pay a $10 flat rate as well as 2.3% of the 
electricity bill in order to repay the Telecom Debt 
(iProvo, 2011). This is a cost to all residents of the 
City, not just those utilizing the Google Fiber network.  
 
Not only was Provo willing to sell the infrastructure network for almost nothing, but there were 
costs incurred on the City related to the transfer of ownership. Provo created a Telecom Fund 




“for upfront capital expenses and operating expenses relating to the sale of the City’s fiber 
network to Google Fiber” (Resolution 2013- 30 p. 1). As a result, Provo was now spending an 
additional $1,722,000 to improve the network to Google Fiber’s standards before selling, akin to 
an owner making repairs on their home before selling. Lastly, the fate of the network aster the 
term of the agreement is unknown. Google theoretically has options to continue operations, sell 
to another party, or even sell back to the City at a higher price if it does not violate the terms of 
the agreement.  
 
Benefits of the project include an upgraded infrastructure; a project the City would likely have 
not have taken part in without the private sector. Additionally, Provo received free fiber for a 
one-time connection fee of $30 to residents for seven years (Network, 2013 p. 5). Additionally, 
Provo claims to be the first “universally connected” Google Fiber city as described by Dixon 
Holmes. He claimed the adoption rate of the network is about 80% in the City, a claim which 
was unable to be confirmed by this study. Evidence of economic development has been strongly 
anecdotal. Dixon Holmes could only point to “the many businesses [he has] personally seen 
come in to Provo” (Holmes, Personal Communication, 2017). It can also be assumed there has 
been increased competition. Document review didn’t reveal any capture of value from the 
Google Fiber partnership. Table 4 summarizes the costs and benefits of the Google Fiber 





Table 4: Costs and Benefits of Fiber in Provo 
Costs Benefits 
-   Lost ownership of publicly financed 
network  
-   Claims of economic development  
 
-   Could not recoup the costs of the 
infrastructure  
-   Free 5 Mbps service to residents for seven 
years  
-   Remaining debt levied on residents who 
may not use the service. 
-   Promised free service to 25 local institutions 
-   Operations unknown after ten-year 
operation period.   
-   $18 million in fiber network upgrades  
 
-   $1,722,000 invested in upgrades as part 
of transfer of ownership agreement.  












Table 5: Case Study Summary 
Category   Chattanooga, TN Kansas City, MO  Provo, UT 
Type  Public Investment, Public 
Operation  
Private Investment, Private Operation Public Investment, Private 
Operation  
Provider  Electric Power Board  Google Fiber  Google Fiber  
Year Service 
Deployed  
2010 2011 iProvo  2004, Google Fiber 2013 
Context  Municipal utility expanded to 
provide telecommunications to 
businesses and homes   
Kansas City bid among 1,100 other 
cities to be the first recipient of 
Google Fiber services  
Provo financed the iProvo fiber 
network for intra-city 
communications, tried multiple 
operators, sold to Google Fiber 
for $1 in 2011.  
Type of 
Contract 
Resolution No. 96-08 Development Contract-Owner and 
Operator   
Asset Purchase, Franchise, 
Network Services, Structure 
Attachment  Agreement   
Term of 
Contract  
No time period  10 years + 5 year renewal period  10 years + 5 year renewal period  
Regulations 
involved  
1996 Telecommunications Act, 
Tennessee state legislature 
which allowed EPB to offer, 
FCC rulings,    
State level video franchising laws, 
City level, Local level willingness to 
waive access fees, pole attachments  
State legislation HB 149 enacted  
to prohibit municipalities from 




Comcast and TCTA sue 
multiple times, but EPB wins  
AT&T, Time Warner Cable sued for 
undisclosed amounts  
Assumed increased competition 
Costs  $111 million in federal 
stimulus money  
$120 in EPB bonds  
At least $2 million in waived fees  
 
$39 million in bonds to finance 
iProvo. Provo won’t charge 
Google for access to City’s 




EPB Chairman first engaged 
25 community leaders that 
would likely oppose the 
project. Then went to public to 
ask for input.  
Resolution to partake in bid process, 
community groups channeled into one 
collaborative Google Doc for 
application, strong public support 
Five public infrastructure 
meetings for building of network. 
One public meeting regarding the 







Chapter 4: Comparative Analysis 
Findings  
	  
The findings of this study comparatively weigh the regulatory costs and societal benefits of fiber 
in the three case studies. They reflect recurrent issues in the fiber network planning process that 
will need further study. Generally, this study finds that fiber optic infrastructure planning 
processes for Internet vary based on a series of factors including state regulation, the definition 
of economic development, and the degree of public support, ownership of the network, 
competition, and power.   
Table 6: Relative Weight of Risks and Benefits 
Case Study Level of Risk  Costs  Benefit  
Type I: Chattanooga, TN High  High High  
Type II: Kansas City, MO Low  High Moderate   
Type III: Provo, UT Moderate High Low  
 
Type I: Chattanooga, TN  
 
The study finds that Chattanooga took high risk with their project and got large returns for their 
community. The costs included high risk in securing electric bond revenues as the financing 
mechanism, additionally relations with existing ISPs who filed suits against EPB were likely to 
be damaged and the legal costs were incurred on the City. The benefits included international 
recognition as being the most reliably connected Smart Grid City and the only 10-gig offering 
city in the country. Benefits also included claims of economic development in the form of new 
businesses, programs to bridge the digital divide, and the general backing from the FCC that 




Type II: Kansas City, MO  
 
The thesis finds that Kansas City gave up large amounts in regulatory costs, and received some 
benefits, however did not necessarily solve all the issues they were hoping with this Type II 
partnership. First, the City did not retain ownership of the network. Since Google was 
responsible for the “design, planning, construction and operation” of the network, the public 
sector was only left to oblige to the set standards (Development, 2011, p.2). Kansas City was 
also willing to give up at least $2 million in revenue from pole and structure attachment fees. 
Waiving this amount set a precedent and led to existing ISPs to ask for parity agreements, 
causing even more loss to the City. The project was insufficient in bridging the digital divide, 
which according to Cindy Circo was one of the main concerns for the City. Initially, Google 
promised to provide free Internet to residents, but after almost four years of operation the entity 
rescinded the offer (Canon, 2016). It can be assumed that many in lower socioeconomic rungs 
relied on that free access, and now the technology was taken away. Benefits of the project 
include claims of economic development and the evolution of the “Startup Village” and expertise 
tourism which was facilitated by the Bi-State Innovation Playbook for business friendly 
initiatives. The City also benefitted from increased competition and extensive press and news 
coverage as the first Google Fiber City.  
Type III: Provo, UT 
  
In the case of Provo, the City gave up a high amount in terms of regulation, similar to Kansas 
City, and received a low amount in return for Google Fiber as an operator. State regulation HB 
149 forced them into a Type III model and as a result used a series of operators while keeping 




was in such a disadvantaged position relative to the tech company that it made it impossible to 
recoup the costs on their investment. This loss of the public ownership of the network and 
Google’s unwillingness to pay the existing bond amount, forced the City to levy a monthly utility 
tax on residents who used the Google Fiber service as well as those who do not. Additionally, 
they asked the City to invest $1,722,000 in technological upgrades for the network before the 
transfer of ownership. In return, Google agreed to make $18 million worth of upgrades to the 
system as well as the promise of providing free Internet to residents for seven years as well was 
equipping 25 local institutions with free 5 Mbps service. 
Table 7: Detailed Costs and Benefits Comparison 




-   $220 million secured ($111 in bonds, 
$120 in ARRA funds)  
-   High risk for utility because used electric 
system revenue as security for bond  
-   Years of lawsuits with existing ISPs 
-   Claims of economic development  
-   Smart Grid made for most reliable intra-city 
communications and also allowed for highest 
speed capacity 
-   International recognition and press for the 
project    
-   Bridging digital divide through education and 
pricing subsidy programs 
-   FCC backed EPB as providing services within 
the scope of the municipal utility   
  
Type II: Kansas 
City, Missouri 
-   No ownership of network  
-   No control over design, planning 
implementation of project  
-   $2 million in waived fees 
-    parity agreements with other ISPs (cost 
unknown) 
-   Unknown if operator will stay after the 
term agreement  
 
-   Claims of economic development  
-   Free press and news coverage  
-   Unable to bridge the digital divide 
-   Increased competition among ISPs  
-   Expertise tourism as a result of first Google 
Fiber city   
Type III: 
Provo, Utah  
-   Lost ownership of publicly financed 
network  
-   Could not recoup the costs of the 
infrastructure  
-   Remaining debt levied on residents who 
may not use the service. 
-   Operations unknown after ten-year 
operation period. 
-   $1,722,000 invested in network upgrades 
for transfer of ownership   
-   Claims of economic development  
-   Free 5 Mbps service to residents for seven 
years  
-   Promised free service to 25 local institutions 
-   $18 million in fiber network upgrades  
-   Increased competition among ISPs  
 






This section discusses topics which arose through interview and document analysis and 
subsequently led to the findings. These topics should be considered as important areas of study 
which contribute to current fiber planning processes.  
The Relationship between State-Level Regulation and Type of PPP  
	  
One of the most significant influencers on the outcomes of fiber networks was the level of state 
regulation. The study finds that cities either use fully public models or varying degrees of PPPs 
to invest in fiber optic networks, a decision largely determined by state regulatory context. From 
the three case studies, it was found that PPPs are likely to take place in both strong and weak 
regulatory state circumstances, but the lead agency is determined by the existing regulatory 
conditions. In areas of high state regulation, such as Provo, investment in the infrastructure may 
be a public initiative, but operation of the network is likely to fall into the hands of the private 
sector making for a Type III project. On the other hand, if state regulation is low, such as in 
Missouri, Type II projects likely take place with the private sector leading the building 
investments with high levels of public support.   
 
Municipal fiber projects, seem to be the exceptions to this finding. If a municipal utility in a 
highly regulated state context is determined to provide Type I operation for their residents such 
as Chattanooga, it can still be possible; however, it will require the cooperation of the FCC and 
federal government funding. With higher levels of support, municipalities are likely to be able to 




providers. Most recently, the FCC’s decision to allow municipalities to expand beyond their 
electric service area was overruled by the US Court of Appeals. Now, municipal fiber providers 
cannot expand beyond their service area which limits the economic returns necessary to be a 
feasible business model.  Since state laws like HB 149 and others expect municipalities to be on 
an even playing field among private providers such as paying taxes and showing returns, they 
should also be allowed to expand into territories where it is economically advantageous for them 
to do so. This overruling also keeps municipalities from expanding to areas where the 
infrastructure and services are needed such as for the rural poor. State regulations continue to 
make municipal projects almost impossible to publicly operate.  
Economic Development  
	  
The study also finds that economic development was claimed as the main benefit of these FTTH 
initiatives. Interviews with city representatives revealed that every city embarking on a fiber 
journey stated they were hoping to gain economic development for his or her city. However, 
when asked to clarify what this economic development meant, all cited anecdotal evidence. 
Rather, than referring to measurable standards, the interviewees cited an influx of small 
businesses, conversations with business owners, and institutions with faster Internet. The 
discomfort with attributing solid numbers to value was best exemplified in the Provo case study. 
When Mr. Holmes was presented with a $50-million-dollar value estimated by Val Hale, 
President of the Utah Valley Chamber of Commerce, he quickly expressed he was uncomfortable 
with that number and would rather attribute the economic development to the series of 
businesses he has spoken to since implementation. Chattanooga was the slight exception to the 




than the other cities, but this study is taken as biased in this thesis. Interestingly, the initial 
reasoning for public investment in fiber optic networks was for intra-city communications as was 
the case in Chattanooga and Provo. Chattanooga started their fiber network in 1996 stating 
technological upgrades for city communications and Provo took out bonds for iProvo for similar 
reasons. Nonetheless, it was found that when it came to deciding whether to connect fiber 
Internet to homes, economic development was the main driver.  
 
The study also suggests economic development may not come from the technology itself, rather 
the economic development stems from the increased national and international presence the 
cities have gained in the tech world from the press surrounding their projects. Many of these 
cities have indicated that their economic development may be due to the novelty surrounding 
being “the first.” Chattanooga was the first city to achieve a Gig of Internet available to home; 
Kansas City, the first recipient of Google Fiber services and Provo, the third Fiber city but the 
first “universally connected” city. The idea of being the first of something or the home to the 
fastest Internet in the world is what all three interviews cited as one of the main benefits from 
their network. Mr. Hays cited Mark Zuckerberg’s sister visiting Chattanooga to check out the 
network, and Ms. Circo cited the free national attention their city was receiving as the Google 
Fiber test bed. Success in this sense may have to do with the branding of these cities and the 
originality they evoke. As more cities continue to receive fiber networks, this factor could 
diminish, possibly decreasing the perception of economic development from these networks.   
 




city, this study performed an analysis of unemployment rates before and after the implementation 
of FTTH connections in each city. The maps, viewed below show that indeed, there has been a 
difference in unemployment rates throughout communities that are serviced with fiber as well as 
those without the service. Thus, it would be impossible to attribute the changes in unemployment 
to the onset of this technology, however the maps do provide context to some of the changes the 
City Representative’s cited in their anecdotal evidences of economic development.   
	  
Figure 11: Provo Unemployment Rates Before and After Google Fiber 
	  






Figure 13: Chattanooga Unemployment Rates Before and After EPB (Entire Area Covered with Fiber) 
 
Public Leadership and Support   
	  
The findings reveal that stakeholder involvement was varied in the planning process for fiber 
Internet, but that public support is vital to the advancement of a fiber network infrastructure 
project. Specifically, outreach to community leaders has been effective. For example, KCMO 
signed a resolution in support of the bid for Google Fiber and then called on community leaders 
for their insight. Chattanooga also first went to community leaders, specifically those who might 
have had reasons to oppose the project, but did so before involving the general public for 
guaranteed support. The iProvo network in Provo took on traditional city planning processes 
with five public hearings leading up to the decision, which could be possible reasons why the 
outcomes of the project lean unfavorably.  
 
The importance of public leadership and support implies city outlook rather than policies. Ken 




community” (Hays, Personal Communication, 2017). Strong leadership from EPB and public 
dialogue were critical at local-level decision-making processes. Harold DePriest was viewed as a 
strong leader when he came to power in EPB, Ken Hays even said he was more of a visionary 
than any of them even imagined. This sort of public leadership from the beginning was exclusive 
in the comparative case study analysis. Cindy Circo also spoke to leadership in Kansas City, in 
which she said at the time of the bid leadership at the Mayor level was lacking and the 
Councilmembers were responsible for the efforts. However, the previous Mayor’s term was over 
at the time of winning the bid and a new mayor who she explains was “such a champion” for the 
Google Fiber project stepped in (Circo, Personal Communication, 2017). Public support also 
includes support from higher levels of government. Chattanooga was the only city in this study 
to have an extensive amount of federal support, both regulatory from the FCC and in the form of 
the ARRA stimulus funds for the completion of their network. There needs to be a high amount 
of political will from all levels of government for municipal projects.  
Ownership of the Network  
	  
In all three case studies, the circumstances concerning ownership differed. In the Type I 
example, ownership remains as a part of the public utility system and as an asset of the City 
itself. The municipality was responsible for the construction and remains responsible for the 
operation and maintenance of the network. However, in the cases with private involvement, the 
question of who is responsible for what remains muddled. For example, in Kansas City, Google 
Fiber holds ownership of the network, yet in the Development Contract, there is no determinant 
clause which dictates what will happen to the network after the ten-year term of the contract is 




hand, Provo lost its network as an asset with the Google Fiber partnership and there are 
implications regarding future ownership after the term of the agreement is over. Provo was 
unable to recoup the costs of its investment, making it dissimilar to the Chicago Expressway’s 
successes. Perhaps the possibility of Google abandoning its fiber projects is not far-fetched since 
there is no certainty regarding what will happen after ten years. One indicator of this includes the 
fact that Google began calling the project a “new business model” on its first blog posts, 
however recent rhetoric on the website calls Google Fiber an “amazing bet” (Barratt, 2016). 
Most recently, the company has halted the expansion of Fiber into other cities and has looked 
towards wireless networks such as Project Loon (What is Project Loon, 2017) and Webpass 
which it acquired in 2016 (Google, 2016). Therefore, the future of these networks is largely 
unknown at the end of the term of the agreement.  
Competition 
	  
The study reveals that existing ISPs have two choices, either attempt to legally stop the new 
entrant, or choose to compete. Slowly, the offerings and speeds will begin to calibrate towards 
the numbers that have been presented by the incoming party. Now, traditional ISP providers are 
rolling out packages with higher speeds and lower costs, a spectacle that would most likely not 
be taking place if it were not for the competition Google Fiber and EPB. In 2008, before EPB 
entered the Internet service market, it was found that Comcast was offering speed tiers of 0.77 
Mbps, 6 Mbps, and 8 Mbps in the Chattanooga area, however once EPB was introduced, the 
entity increased its download speeds up to 12 Mbps and 22 Mbps (FCC 15-24, 2015). 
Circumstances meant to attract the entrance of Google Fiber are perceived as potential threats to 




confrontations with existing providers.  
Power 
	  
The retention of power between the public and private sectors is also an area of findings 
pertinent to this discussion. Chattanooga’s decision-making process was highly influenced by the 
heavy support for the municipal fiber network from the public utility, EPB. In this case, 
Flyvbjerg’s discussion of power and rationality becomes relevant in the sense that EPB, the 
powerholder, defined the reality in which it operated in. This new definition involved a reality in 
which Chattanooga was missing a major opportunity if it did not actively seek this fiber network. 
Conversely, Kansas City was almost devoid of power in the decision-making process for fiber. 
Instead, Google Fiber was responsible for defining Kansas City’s reality as a city in need of 
Google’s help. This play between who holds the power reveals that decision-making, or 
rationality as Flyvbjerg says, is context-dependent (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Therefore, assessing which 
entity holds power in each city context could reveal what the probable outcomes of the 
infrastructural planning process may be. Flyvbjerg goes even further and argues “the greater the 
power, the less the rationality” and in the Type III Provo case study, where power was almost 
entirely given to the private entity, the public sector agreed to outcomes that did not logically 
benefit its residents.   
 






Based on the findings of this study, there are a series of recommendations to be made when 
weighing whether a city should opt for fiber optic Internet infrastructures and what the role of the 
planner should be in these processes. In summary, this study recommends that planners should 
become the communicators between the public and private sectors.  
 
In practice, this recommendation would first necessitate planners as the architects of the public 
participation processes. These procedures should encourage open dialogue between cities and 
communities about whether the public wants the network or not, since their support is crucial to 
the success of the network. Two of the three case studies first reached out to community leaders 
who had particular stakes at play with the development of a fiber optic network. Reaching out to 
those leaders first was an effective way of learning community interests and then marketing their 
efforts to address those concerns. The planner also needs to be clear on the stipulations set on the 
private sector. Safeguards need to be put in place to ensure that there is equitable distribution of 
this infrastructure and planners are in the unique position to instigate those formative rules. 
Regulations such as limiting the rate of return on city-wide infrastructures could be instituted by 
planners as a means of reconciling the fiduciary duties of the private sector to its shareholders 
and the public sector to its responsibility to the general public.  
 
Planners should also be resourceful and use the lessons of historical precedents, like cable 
television, to facilitate the successes of fiber internet. In this example, the invention of cable was 




Planners could frame fiber internet in such a way, and allocate space on these networks for 
democratic purposes such as local government information sharing as a way to make the need for 
these networks more compelling. Stressing the importance of fiber internet to American ideals 
could be instrumental in catapulting the technology from an out-of-pocket service, to a 
government backed expenditure at all levels of government.  
 
Also, city planners should consider the regulatory context their municipality operates in and the 
state of its existing infrastructure. If there is high regulatory context and the network is already 
built, cities should consider a Type III partnership, only if they are able to recoup the costs of 
their initial investment from the negotiated deal with the private party. For example, in the 
Chicago Expressway example, the City was able to cover their debt with the 99-year lease to the 
private sector. If there is high regulation and no existing infrastructure, a city could consider 
municipal networks since private operators are unlikely to advance their speeds because of 
constrained competition. In Type I cases, the introduction of a municipal network could be an 
equitable and stimulating response to natural monopolies, however these should only be 
developed if there are high levels of leadership and support from all levels of government. 
Understanding the context of their existing conditions is vital in determining what the best route 
is for their city.  
 
A standard by which planners measure the benefit of increased broadband capacity also needs to 
be developed. In the study, the case study cities largely conceded to a vague understanding of 




return the city should expect from a fiber Internet network and there was also no clear answer as 
to what the cities have gained from these networks. Planners should outline clear standards 
explaining how to measure this benefit, whether it be a function of unemployment growth, or a 
survey done before and after implementation of the project in order to gauge true progress. 
Additionally, there is growing concern that even if economic development is occurring, there is 
question as to who is receiving it. Currently, none of the cities have local hire stipulations in their 
contracts with the fiber providers. These could ensure the incoming businesses are employing 
existing residents rather than bringing in new people.  
 
Lastly, planners need to think beyond the fixed-term agreements with these private entities. 
Currently, especially among Type II and Type III agreements, there is much unknown about 
future of these networks. Google’s ownership of the networks means that the private sector will 
have permanent leverage over the cities they have invested in. Planners need to outline clearly in 
their negotiated agreements who will answer to questions of ownership, maintenance, and 
operations at the end of the ten-year contracts. If Google finds that this business is less profitable 
than they may have previously anticipated, which seems to be the case since they recently 










In the twentieth century, the public sector led the ‘drive’ toward a nationalized interstate 
highway system that for better or for worse forever changed the physical, cultural and economic 
landscape of the United States. Today, much like in the past, the country is poised to adapt built 
environments in order to facilitate progress. Although this time, instead of physical interventions 
that transform spaces to accommodate transportation, the transportation of knowledge, ideas, and 
innovation is facilitated by fiber optic infrastructure. And just like how the public sector exerted 
certain powers to create a robust transportation network in the twentieth century, this thesis finds 
that the retention of power is just as important, if not more important, in creating the new 
transportation information networks of the twenty first century. 
 
However, the shift towards PPPs for fiber network infrastructure reveals a greater trend in 
financing approaches to city-wide infrastructures by the public sector. Cities today look to the 
private sector to upgrade American infrastructure however, in forging the partnerships and 
processes to implement infrastructure improvements, the public sector often gives up the 
inherent powers that makes them viable negotiators and regulators in the first place. The 
implications of this study are that a significant difference exists between the inherent interests of 
the private sector and the public sector in that one aims to satisfy public stakeholders and the 
other, private shareholders. As the public sector in theory strives to serve public interests, the 
private sector primarily will always be most loyal to their fiduciary duty, a gap that cannot be 





Planners are vital in aiding the fiber connectivity process by helping draw equitable and 
beneficial results for the public sector. In PPPs, planners must be the communicators between the 
public and the private sector, and foster a symbiotic relationship that needs the support of one 
another to survive. Planners should communicate concerns and produce robust recommendations 
for cities as they embark on fiber optic network opportunities. Overall, the story of fiber optic 
partnerships in the US demonstrates that collaboration between government and the private 
sector is essential for progress, but also uncovers that a balance must be maintained in 
negotiating those upgrades. The future of PPPs in technological development is certainly bright, 
and urban planners can be at the forefront of this next phase of infrastructure investment to 
ensure that cities will continue toward increased interconnectivity while maintaining public 
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